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bstract
This paper adopts a vulnerability perspective to look into some of the key developmental issues that have been raised in discussions following the
lobal financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009. We contend that country vulnerability, defined as probability  of  shocks  ×  (exposure  −  resilience),
atters for future growth and poverty reduction. However, different ways of dealing with vulnerability all have specific advantages as well as
ownsides. First, coping  with the aftermath of shocks can be painful and is inherently backward-looking. Second, prevention  by reducing exposure is
ypically a long-term process. Third, increasing resilience through self-insurance  often carries high opportunity costs. And fourth, market  insurance
nd  hedging  may be politically sensitive and is largely unavailable to countries that need it most. Hence we argue for a multi-layered ‘therapy’,
ombining different approaches with attention to the short and long term, mindful of country specifics and with roles to play for both developing
ountries themselves and international actors. A tentative exploration of how vulnerability has been dealt with before and during the crisis suggests
hat, in some areas, important progress has been made. Nevertheless, and particularly for low-income countries, there is still a long way to go.
 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
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.  Introduction
The world economy has taken a rough ride over the past
ears, with 2009 seeing the first decline of global GDP in post-
ar history. Not only advanced economies have bore the brunt.
ome developing countries, initially deemed to be spared from
 crisis originating in a small segment of the US financial sys-
em, were among the hardest-hit victims. Back-of-the-envelope
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alculations, based on country growth rates, suggest that the cri-
is may have added as much as 50 million to the number of people
iving with under US$1.25 a day in 2009, relative to a no-crisis
cenario, and around 64 million at the end of 2010 (World Bank,
010). More controversially, Friedman and Schady (2009) pro-
ected that the crisis could leave an extra 30,000–50,000 infants
ead in Sub-Saharan Africa. True, economic revival has been
elatively quick in the developing world; but sovereign debt
roblems in the US and the eurozone could just as quickly stall
he recovery process.
A huge and growing volume of academic and policy work is
estimony to the pervasiveness and the complexity of the debates
he crisis has spawned, also with respect to future development
aths of non-advanced economies. This paper attempts to sys-
emise some of the key issues for developing countries raised by
he crisis by taking a vulnerability perspective, inspired by the
olatility and exogenous shocks literature.
We believe the paper’s contribution is twofold. First, we
ropose a new, improved formula for the concept of devel-
ping country vulnerability. Decomposing vulnerability into
ubcomponents offers much-needed conceptual clarification
nd is helpful for understanding and commenting on exist-
ng vulnerability measurement efforts. Second, by linking
ur new vulnerability formula to Perry’s (2009) work on
anaging volatility, the paper brings together a number of
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ulnerability-reducing strategies and development finance
nstruments that have all received attention in the wake of the
risis but have largely been studied in isolation. In doing so, it
s shown that the fight against vulnerability is one on multiple
ronts and with roles for both developing countries themselves
nd the international community.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets
he scene by looking into the origins, progression and multi-
imensional character of the global financial and economic
risis. Special attention is given to the main transmission chan-
els of the crisis from its epicentre (the US and other advanced
conomies) to developing countries. Section 3, the core of the
aper, lays out our theoretical framework; it develops a con-
ept of vulnerability we think is useful to examine important
evelopment issues in light of the crisis. A first subsection
efines developing country vulnerability and its different build-
ng blocks: (the  probability  of)  shocks, exposure  and resilience.
econd, we briefly dwell on previous and ongoing efforts in mea-
uring these concepts and where such efforts could be enhanced.
hird, vulnerability to shocks is shown to matter for growth and
overty reduction. In a fourth and final subsection, we draw
n Perry (2009) to classify possible ways of dealing with such
ulnerability into four categories – coping, prevention, self-
nsurance  and market  insurance  and  hedging  – and link them to
he earlier-defined concepts of exposure and resilience. It is con-
ended that each of these four strategies has advantages as well as
ownsides and that a multi-layered ‘therapy’ is warranted. Sec-
ion 4 illustrates the practical use of the proposed framework by
xploring, in a non-exhaustive manner, how vulnerability has
een dealt with in practice prior to and during the crisis, first
y developing countries themselves and second by multilateral
evelopment banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
uch a tentative exploration suggests that, in some areas, impor-
ant progress has been made. Nevertheless, and particularly for
ow-income countries, there is still a long way to go. Section 5
oncludes and proposes an agenda for moving forward.
.  A  global  crisis:  origins  and  transmission
The latest global financial and ensuing economic crisis has
eft nobody indifferent. Many have carefully dissected the chain
f events of the past few years in an attempt to identify the
ey causes of this global havoc, often coming to very different
r even outright conflicting conclusions. Most observers would
gree, however, that the 2007–2009 crisis reflects a ‘remark-
ble confluence of [multiple] factors’, some akin to those in
revious periods of financial upheaval but others unseen before
Claessens et al., 2010: 4). We do not attempt to sum up or
ive a judgment on the importance of each of these factors and
eeper causes.1 Rather, the following two subsections present
 brief (and inevitably simplified) overview of how seemingly
1 We refer the interested reader to Krugman (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff
2009), Stiglitz (2009, 2010), Taylor (2009), Caballero (2010), Rajan (2010), and
oubini and Mihm (2010), among numerous others, for different perspectives
n the deeper causes of the crisis.
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nsignificant events in the US housing market contaminated the
ider financial sector and real economy and eventually impacted
n developing countries through various channels of transmis-
ion.
.1.  Where  did  it  all  start?
Most commentators point to the bursting of the US housing
ubble and the subsequent increase in subprime mortgage loan
efault rates as triggering the global financial crisis (see e.g.
aily et al., 2008; Felton and Reinhart, 2008; Brunnermeier,
008).
In the decade before the crisis, housing prices were rapidly
ising in a number of advanced economies, especially in the US,
ausing (and fuelled by) an equally rapid expansion of lending
o subprime borrowers, people with no reliable source of income
r solid loan repayment history. In order to be able to provide
n increasing amount of such risky subprime mortgage loans,
 new generation of mortgage brokers and associated bank-
ng institutions engaged in pooling subprime mortgages into
ackages (such as collateralised debt obligations or CDOs) and
elling securities backed by those packages to interested finan-
ial investors (Baily et al., 2008). Such ‘originate-to-distribute’
ractices were initially thought to help in off-loading risk to
hose who were willing (and best-placed) to bear it. Securi-
isation and the widespread use of other innovative but often
oorly understood financial products however led to an increased
paqueness of the financial system, masking the risk faced by
ifferent market participants. At the same time, the growing
opularity of the securitisation of (subprime) mortgage loans
ushed up the price of the underlying real estate. This in turn led
o cheaper credit and deteriorating lending standards, feeding
ack into an ever-appreciating housing market.
This positive loop turned into a vicious cycle from July 2007
nwards, when subprime mortgage defaults accumulated and
et off a chain reaction of write-downs and losses, affecting a
roader range of US as well as European financial institutions.
oon the market for mortgage- and other short-term asset-
acked securities dried up (see Brunnermeier, 2008). Liquidity
urther stalled in interbank and commercial paper markets as
obody had a clear idea about the size of counterparty risk
ue to the complex structure and interrelatedness of parties.
tock market prices declined and financial institutions faced
ajor runs as the scramble for liquidity by market participants
egan.
One critical turning point was when the US government
efused to save Lehman Brothers from its collapse on September
5th, 2008. This bankruptcy shocked market confidence and
aused financial panic, the effects of which rippled further
hroughout a highly interconnected and overleveraged global
nancial system. In the months thereafter, what started as liquid-
ty problems transformed into greater solvency concerns about
mportant global financial institutions (Claessens et al., 2010).
ventually, also consumers and firms faced a credit stop, leading
o falls in consumption and investment and a real sector slow-
own in the US and Western Europe. A systemic economic crisis
as born.
D. Essers / Review of Developme
Table 1
Real GDP growth (% change) per country group and in selected individual
countries. Author’s compilation from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO)
database (September 2011).
2007 2008 2009
Developing countries (150) 8.9 6.0 2.8
Central and Eastern Europe (14) 5.5 3.1 −3.6
Poland 6.8 5.1 1.6
Latvia 10.0 −4.2 −18.0
Commonwealth of Independent States (13) 8.9 5.3 −6.4
Uzbekistan 9.5 9.0 8.1
Russia 8.5 5.2 −7.8
Developing Asia (27) 11.5 7.7 7.2
China 14.2 9.6 9.2
Cambodia 10.2 6.7 −2.0
ASEAN-5 6.3 4.8 1.7
Indonesia 6.3 6.0 4.6
Thailand 5.0 2.6 −2.4
Latin America and the Caribbean (32) 5.8 4.3 −1.7
Bolivia 4.6 6.1 3.4
Mexico 3.2 1.2 −6.2
Middle East and North Africa (20) 6.7 4.6 2.6
Lebanon 7.5 9.3 8.5
Saudi Arabia 2.0 4.2 0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa (44) 7.1 5.6 2.8
Zambia 6.2 5.7 6.4
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Baldwin (2009) further explains the divergence between GDP
and trade movements by showing that postponable goods such
as consumer durables and investment goods, which suffered
4 Purposely, two countries with divergent growth experiences were selectedngola 22.6 13.8 2.4
.2.  How  did  developing  countries  become  affected?
Developing countries, especially low-income countries, were
ong thought to be more or less decoupled from the US and
estern European economies (see e.g. the discussion in IMF,
007: Chapter 4). Even more than a year after the onset of US
nancial sector troubles it was commonly believed that ‘some
f the same (undesirable) factors that have kept a significant
hare of the developing world’s population in deep and per-
istent poverty.  .  .[would] protect them to some degree from
he crisis’ (Development Research Group, 2008: 2).2 These
opes turned out to be overly optimistic, especially after the
ollapse of Lehman Brothers, as witnessed by the IMF and
orld Bank’s stepwise downward revisions of developing coun-
ry growth rates (Naudé, 2009a). At the time of writing, the IMF
eported real GDP growth of 2.8% for the developing world as
 whole in 2009, down from 8.9% and 6.0% in 2007 and 2008,
espectively.3
Table 1 shows the breakdown of IMF growth figures in coun-
ry groups as well as figures for selected countries. Clearly,
here are significant differences across groups. CEE and CIS
ountries seem to have been much more affected, on average,
han developing Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa. Growth discrep-
ncies between individual countries are also apparent from
able 1, hinting at the working of multiple crisis transmission
2 Expressions such as ‘Lagos is not Lehman’, quoted in te Velde (2008), are
xemplary of such beliefs.
3 These figures are weighted averages for the 150 countries classified as emerg-
ng and developing economies in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO)
eports.
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echanisms (with varying intensity).4 As can be seen, Cam-
odia’s growth experience, for example, is very different from
hat of China and Zambia does not compare with Angola. Nev-
rtheless, the overall picture of slowing (and sometimes even
egative) growth in the developing world overtly dispels the
ecoupling myth. How could the tide turn so drastically for
eveloping countries?
The literature on the transmission of the crisis to developing
ountries is vast and set to grow in the coming years as more
ata becomes available.5 One obvious way the crisis could pos-
ibly spread to the developing world was through the holding by
eveloping country banks of the same toxic assets that troubled
estern banks’ balance sheets, or through investments in foreign
nancial institutions that held such assets (Naudé, 2009b). Direct
ontagion was however limited in most developing countries,
ue to modest foreign bank penetration (with the exception of
EE countries) and low financial sector complexity. As a result,
merging and other developing economies were largely insu-
ated from the crisis for some months (Dooley and Hutchison,
009), in part explaining initial optimism about decoupling. The
ar-reaching consequences of the crisis for these countries only
ecame noticeable with a lag, from September 2008 onwards
the post-Lehman era). Most analyses identify four, more indi-
ect channels of transmission as most important: trade, private
apital flows, remittances and international bilateral aid. In the
emainder of this section we briefly discuss these four channels
n turn.
.2.1.  Trade
As global demand slumped because of postponed consump-
ion and investment in advanced economies, world trade did so
oo, before abruptly collapsing late 2008.6 An important driver
f growth in developing countries, trade is overall considered as
he number one channel of crisis transmission for many of them
see e.g. case studies in ODI, 2010; Berman and Martin, 2009).
he World Bank (2010) reports an estimated 11.6% decline in
orld trade for 2009, much worse than the 2.1% downfall in
orld GDP that year.
It seems that the elasticity of global trade to income
as steadily increased over time (Freund, 2009), amplifying
he impact of (developed country) recessions on trade flows.or each group in Table 1.
5 Early accounts are e.g. Lin (2008), te Velde (2008), IDS (2008) and Naudé
2009b). For more comprehensive studies, sometimes with ample empiri-
al evidence, see e.g. ODI (2009, 2010), IMF (2009a), World Bank (2009a:
hapter 1), Mold et al. (2009) and Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2009); and for
egional perspectives, see e.g. Goldstein and Xie (2009), Caparas et al. (2008),
wiston (2010), Kasekende et al. (2009), EUI (2009: Chapter 6) and Allen and
iovannetti (2011).
6 The fall in global trade between 2008Q3 and 2009Q2 was the steepest in
ecorded history (and deepest since WWII) and has therefore been labelled the
Great Trade Collapse’ (Baldwin, 2009).
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inflows shrunk to US$354 billion or about 60% of their 2008
value (World Bank, 2011), prompting a serious questioning of
104 D. Essers / Review of Devel
specially hard from growing risk aversion in the West, make up
 large slice of world trade while accounting for only a minor
hare in world GDP. This was compounded by the synchronisa-
ion of trade contractions due to the vertically integrated nature
f global production chains (see Cheung and Guichard, 2009;
i Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009). At first, a freeze in trade
nance (such as letters of credit) was projected to contribute
urther to global trade collapse (Dorsey, 2009). Later studies
owever seem to downplay its importance (ODI, 2010; Mora
nd Powers, 2009).
A recession in trade volumes  was arguably the chief crisis
erpetrator for exporters of (more capital-intensive) manufac-
ures and services whereas negative price  effects prevailed in
ountries exporting primary goods (often low-income countries)
Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2009). In the latter group, espe-
ially those countries that depend heavily on oil and mineral
xports, were hit hard. Following a boom that started in 2003,
il, mineral and other commodity prices started to dwindle in
uly 2008 and plummeted to pre-boom levels soon thereafter
see World Bank, 2009b). Copper prices, for example, dropped
rom almost US$9000 per metric tonne in June 2008 to less than
S$3000 in December of that year,7 adversely impacting on
he terms of trade and export earnings of major exporters such
s Zambia and the DR Congo (Kabuya Kalala and Cassimon,
010). To be sure, this rapid reversal of commodity price trends
ad positive impacts on the import bill of other countries, some
f which were experiencing severe food and fuel crises at the
ime (see IMF, 2008a).8 On an aggregate level however, devel-
ping world terms of trade reportedly diminished by 4.2% in
009 (IMF, 2010a).
.2.2.  Private  capital  ﬂows
Private capital flows were a second key channel of crisis trans-
ission, especially (but not exclusively) in emerging economies
ntegrated into international capital markets. Again, both vol-
me and price (or cost) effects were at play (Griffith-Jones and
campo, 2009); faced with high uncertainty, investors redi-
ected their money to safe haven assets such as US Treasury
ills (which seems ironic in view of the crisis’ origins), while
he global credit crunch also made the available financing more
ostly.
First, net private capital inflows to developing countries were
round US$716 billion for 2008, down from a record-high
S$1.1 trillion in 2007 (World Bank, 2011). Estimates for 2009
uggest a further drop to US$521 billion. History repeated itself
s private capital flows once again turned out highly procyclical
see Kaminsky et al., 2004).Second, with respect to cost effects, Dooley and Hutchison
2009) find that bad financial and real sector news emanat-
ng from the US significantly pushed up credit default swap
7 These figures are for copper grade A contracts traded on the London Metal
xchange (see http://www.lme.com).
8 However, while international food prices came down from their mid-2008
eaks, they turned out to be rather sticky (more so than other commodity
rices), remaining high by historical standards in spite of the crisis (see Negrete
ardenas, 2009).
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CDS) spreads in emerging markets in the post-Lehman period,
uggesting a strong recoupling of these markets with the inter-
ational financial system. A number of low-income countries,
ncluding Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, were said to have post-
oned bond issuance plans because of increased risk premia
Kasekende et al., 2009).
A third effect was a remarkable alteration in global exchange
ate movements. From the intensification of the crisis in the sum-
er of 2008 onwards, but particularly in the weeks following
he Lehman bankruptcy, the US dollar appreciated drastically
gainst virtually all advanced and emerging country curren-
ies, partly due to the flight-to-safety pattern of capital flows
owards US fixed-income instruments (see Fratzscher, 2009).
he South African rand, for example, lost no less than 35% of
ts value between mid-September and mid-October 2008 (IDS,
008).
Looking into the behaviour of different sorts of capital flows
rovides additional insights. Across developing countries, port-
olio equity and short-term debt flows were hit most severely in
008, with outflows of US$53 billion and US$14 billion, respec-
ively (World Bank, 2011). Stock market prices fell dramatically
n developing countries, reflecting a decline in corporate valua-
ions (particularly of companies active in export sectors) (IMF,
009a). The Merrill Lynch Africa Lions Index, for example,
eeping track of some 15 African countries, saw a decline of
lmost 70% over the period March–December 2008. Didier
t al. (2010), who study co-movements between US and other,
merging country stock market returns, find that they were
hiefly driven by financial linkages such as the presence of US
nvestors in other countries’ stock markets and higher degrees
f liquidity. They also observe a wake-up call effect in the pre-
ehman stage of the crisis, when countries with weaker banking
nd corporate sector fundamentals display greater comovement
ith US stock markets. On the debt side, the drying-up of
lobal bank lending played an important transmission role as
irect cross-border lending by developed country banks, inter-
al lending to emerging country affiliates by those banks, and
ccess to inter-bank loans by local (stand-alone) emerging coun-
ry banks all nearly evaporated (see Cetorelli and Goldberg,
010).
Overall net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to
eveloping countries, hailed in the past as a more stable
nd crisis-inelastic form of finance (see e.g. Levchenko and
auro, 2007),9 were still growing in 2008, albeit at a much
lower pace than in pre-crisis years. In 2009 however, FDIheir supposedly acyclical nature. Anecdotal evidence from
9 This proposition is based on arguments related to the typical longer-term
erspective of multinational enterprise investors and the existence of possibilities
or M&As at bargain prices (so-called fire sale FDI) in times of crisis (see Aguiar
nd Gopinath, 2005).
10 Bhinda and Martin (2009) explain this by pointing out that much of what
s accounted for as FDI going to developing countries exists of intra-company
oans (which very much resemble procyclical debt flows) and that only a minor
art constitutes genuine new equity.
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sify different ways of dealing with vulnerability and outline their
respective advantages and disadvantages.D. Essers / Review of Devel
ow-income countries indicates that new investment projects
ere cancelled or postponed and that existing projects were
caled back in sectors such as mining, energy and heavy indus-
ry (linked to lower commodity prices), construction and tourism
see Bhinda and Martin, 2009).
.2.3. Remittances
In the years leading up to the crisis, remittances were reported
o be growing steadily at double-digit rates (an annual aver-
ge growth rate of about 20% for 2001–2007, see World Bank,
011). Ever since the global turmoil became evident, its poten-
ial impact on remittance flows to the developing world has been
 matter of debate. On the one hand, faced with adverse eco-
omic conditions in the developed countries they reside and
onsidering the sectors (e.g. construction) they typically work in,
igrants may be less likely to send money abroad. On the other
and, remittance senders may try to respond to the worsened situ-
tion of recipients in developing countries, themselves affected
y the crisis, by increasing transfers. Frankel (2009) presents
mpirical evidence in support of both of these hypotheses; remit-
ances tend to be countercyclical with respect to income in the
orker’s country of origin, while procyclical with respect to
ncome in the migrant’s host country. The global nature of the cri-
is thus made it hard to predict ex ante the net effect on remittance
ows.
Using coefficients derived from various models taking
nto account both source and host country factors, Calì and
ell’Erba (2009) estimate that remittances to developing
ountries dropped by US$23 billion to US$67 billion in total
or 2009. World Bank figures, based on central bank surveys,
ut forward a lower US$18 billion decline (from US$325 bil-
ion in 2008 to US$307 billion in 2009) and predict a quick
ecovery for 2010–2012 (Mohapatra et al., 2010). This makes
nternational remittances a reliable source of finance in times
f crisis, relative to other flows. Global figures however mask
he underlying regional (and country) disparities in remittance
nflow evolutions. Eastern Europe and Central Asia experienced
he largest percentage decline in 2009 (−20.7%), followed by
atin America and the Caribbean region (−12.3%). In South
sia, remittance transfers slowed down but continued to grow
albeit at only 4.9%) (Ratha et al., 2010).
Although the detrimental impact of the crisis on remittances
s irrefutable, important measuring problems remain. Because
f the relative paucity of data on informal, non-official transfers
which are likely to vary across countries), remittance statis-
ics and trends could well be seriously understated (Freund
nd Spatafora, 2008). Conversely, increased attention to money
ransfers together with improvements in (formal channel) data
ecording may have artificially inflated pre-crisis remittance
rowth rates in the first place (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2010).
.2.4. International  bilateral  aid
International bilateral aid is the fourth transmission chan-
el which has repeatedly featured in reports on the crisis. One
ould expect that as developed donor countries themselves expe-
ience severe growth contractions and have spend billions on
t
mnt Finance 3 (2013) 61–83 65
nancial sector bailouts, they may be less willing to disburse
id to developing countries.
At first sight, overall bilateral aid levels seem not to have been
reatly affected by the crisis. OECD statistics show that total net
fficial Development Assistance (ODA) by Development Assis-
ance Committee (DAC) members continued to grow in real US
ollar terms in 2009 and 2010, reaching hitherto unprecedented
evels (see OECD-DAC, 2011).
This is certainly no guarantee for the future. Roodman (2008),
or example, notes that OECD donors Finland, Japan, Norway
nd Sweden did  cut back on their aid flows in the aftermath
f domestic banking crises they underwent in the 1990s. More
igorous analysis by Frot (2009) finds that a banking crisis in a
onor country negatively impacts on both the level and trend
f aid. Similarly, Dang et al. (2010) show that, for the 30-
ear period leading up to 2007, banking crises led to marked
nd long-lasting declines in aid flows (of around 20–25% and
ottoming out only after a decade), possibly reflecting, besides
ncome-related effects, the costs of dealing with post-crisis fis-
al debt overhangs in donor countries. They argue that there
re serious reasons to expect aid disbursements in the com-
ng years to be lower than would have been the case if the
risis had not occurred.11 Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) concur
ith these propositions and further show that, confronted with
arge economic downturns, donors have traditionally curbed aid
ows to low-income countries by more than to middle-income
ountries. The existing evidence thus points at considerable
ncertainty surrounding future bilateral aid; whether donors will
eact in the same way as they did in the past remains to be
een.
In view of the just-described transmission channels and the
esulting impact on developing country growth (apparent from
able 1), many commentators have invoked, in some way or
nother, notions of ‘vulnerability’ (e.g. Mold et al., 2009; IMF,
010b,c). Developing countries, low-income countries in par-
icular, have been labelled vulnerable to the global crisis (in
etrospect) and vulnerable to future turbulence in the world
conomy. The use of the term ‘vulnerability’, while increasingly
ommon, is however seldom meticulous and often confusing, not
t the least because of the divergent meanings attached to it by
ifferent researchers. Yet, we believe the concept of vulnerability
tself, if sufficiently specified, provides a useful perspective from
hich to examine jointly a number of development issues raised
y the crisis (and by developing countries’ volatile external envi-
onment more generally). In the following section we therefore
ttempt to offer some conceptual clarification: first, we define
ulnerability and its different building blocks; second, we look
nto the measurement of the different concepts; third, we explain
hy vulnerability matters for development; and fourth, we clas-11 Indeed, sovereign debt and fiscal problems (second-round effects of the crisis
hat started in 2007) have already led to severe cuts in the aid budgets of eurozone
embers such as Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain.
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Briguglio et al., 2009). This ability can be expected to depend on
a country’s available resources, both financial and institutional.
Therefore, counter to exposure, country resilience is largely
14 Shocks need not to be negative, of course, with rising commodity prices or
capital flow surges being obvious examples of positive shocks. In fact, much of
the framework we develop in this section can, in principle, also be used to study
the likelihood of countries benefitting from positive shocks (which one could
denote as ‘positive vulnerability’). However, since the current paper is above
all concerned with the global crisis and in keeping with the majority part of the
literature on vulnerability to external shocks, we will confine the analysis in this
paper to negative shocks only.
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.  Developing  country  vulnerability
.1.  Deﬁning  vulnerability  and  its  components
The idea of vulnerability has a long history and appli-
ations in a wide range of social and natural sciences (for
n extensive overview, see Villagrán De León, 2006). Within
evelopment economics, vulnerability research has traditionally
een situated on the level of households (see e.g. Chambers,
989; Dercon, 2001; or more recently, Naudé et al., 2009a). In
ecent years however, particularly in the aftermath of the East
sian crisis, a growing body of literature on country-level vul-
erability has emerged (e.g. Briguglio, 1995; Committee for
evelopment Policy, 1999; Atkins et al., 2000; Guillaumont,
001, 2009; Teunissen and Akkerman, 2005; Briguglio et al.,
009; Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanney, 2009).12 It is this
acro-economic vulnerability of emerging and non-emerging
eveloping countries that will be the further focus of our paper.
In very general terms, vulnerability can be defined as the
ikelihood of a system being negatively affected by some sort of
erturbation or sudden ‘shock’ going beyond the normal range
f variability (see Gallopín, 2006).13 Here we assign the system
o be an individual (developing) country and the perturbation to
e a number of macro-economic shocks such as the transmission
echanisms of the global crisis (described in Section 2.2). This
rings us close to Guillaumont’s (2009: 197) dynamic definition
f vulnerability as ‘the risk that economic growth [of a country]
s markedly and extensively reduced by shocks’. Consequently,
ulnerability, in the sense we use it here, can be seen to have three
istinguishable components or building blocks: the nature of the
hocks in question, the exposure  of a country to these shocks and
he country’s ability to react appropriately, or its resilience  (cf.
uillaumont, 2001, 2009). We discuss these three components
n turn.
First, a shock  can be conceptualised as an event which impacts
nexpectedly on a country’s economy, and which is exogenous
r beyond the control of that country’s government to prevent,
aking it discernible from ‘non-shocks’ such as predictable
nd/or recurrent trends and policy-induced (i.e. endogenous)
vents (Martin and Bargawi, 2005). Similarly, such shocks
an be seen as instances of extreme input volatility, to be
istinguished from output volatility such as the growth trend
eviations they may cause (see Varangis et al., 2004 and Section
.3). What constitutes ‘extreme’ here is, of course, a matter of
udgement and has implications for measurement (see Section
.2).From the perspective of developing countries, the global
nancial and economic crisis clearly satisfies the unexpected-
ess and exogeneity criteria of a shock. It originated in a small
12 There is of course a clear link between the different echelons of study, as
he vulnerability of households is often a direct consequence of that on the
acro-level (Guillaumont, 2009). For a rare study on sub-national (regional)
ulnerability, see Naudé et al. (2009b).
13 Gallopín (2006) also considers the possibility of the perturbation to be a
ontinuous or slowly increasing ‘stress’ (commonly within the range of normal
ariability). For the purpose of this paper we make abstract of such stresses.
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egment of the US financial system, far away from any develop-
ng country’s influence, before spreading all over the globe with
 pace that had not been seen before. The crisis in fact repre-
ents a wave of successive shocks (Naudé, 2009a), with multiple
nd interacting dimensions: financial shocks under the form of
eclining private capital flows (FDI, portfolio equity and debt),
emittances and aid, and real sector trade shocks in terms of both
olumes and prices.14
Shock events can take the form of so-called common shocks
hat affect multiple countries simultaneously (though not nec-
ssarily to the same extent); a steep drop of international
ommodity prices or a global collapse in investor confidence, for
xample. Alternatively, it is possible that shocks are the result of
ontagion, i.e. economic troubles spilling over from one country
o another (and then to the next), say, the drying up of export
emand by an important trade partner. Observationally, however,
ommon shocks and contagion are often very similar.15
The second component of vulnerability is exposure, which
n the context of this paper refers to the degree or extent to
hich a country can catch shocks coming from the outside.
he size, depth and configuration of a country’s economy all
nfluence how large exposure to specific external shocks is (see
uillaumont, 2009). Most economists, even staunch free mar-
et defenders, would now concede that as countries integrate
nto the global economy, opening up their economy to interna-
ional trade and financial markets, they increase their exposure to
hocks and, ceteris paribus, the risk of marked negative impacts
n their economic growth. Exposure is, although perhaps often
tructural (meaning quasi-permanent), at least partly a policy
hoice and thus amendable, be it in the longer run.16
The third and last building block of vulnerability is resilience,
o be interpreted here as a country’s capacity to counteract
hocks appropriately, or more specifically, its ability to with-
tand or adjust quickly from the shocks it is exposed to (seeFor complementary, empirical common shock and contagion models of
he latest crisis, see Rose and Spiegel (2009) and Rose and Spiegel (2010),
espectively.
16 Here we beg to differ from Briguglio et al. (2009), who defend that country
xposure is inherently structural. Briguglio et al.’s point of view is understand-
ble as their analysis is founded on research on small (island) developing states
see Briguglio, 1995). Indeed, small states have (quasi-)permanent features such
s small domestic markets and limited natural resource endowments which drive
hem automatically towards relatively greater economic openness and therefore
ore exposure. Nevertheless, we are inclined to agree with Abousleiman et al.
2007: 3), which note that ‘. . .in the long run, the exogeneity of any measure of
xposure [to shocks], with perhaps the exception of certain natural disasters, is
ighly questionable’.
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of this sample of shock events the episodes in which countries
experience negative per capita growth in the shock year and have
a below-trend output level in the two years following the shock
17 Frankel and Saravelos (2010) provide an extensive review of the early war-
ning literature and test the predictive power of its leading indicators for the
cross-country incidence of the 2008–2009 global crisis.
18 Together with the Vulnerability Exercise for advanced economies (VEA)D. Essers / Review of Devel
olicy-induced or self-inflicted. However, and in sharp contrast
ith Briguglio et al. (2009) and others, we choose to incor-
orate resilience into the concept of vulnerability, next to the
hocks and exposure components, rather than to see it as the
olicy-induced flip side or antonym of ‘structural vulnerabil-
ty’ (or exposure). As suggested earlier, the dichotomy between
tructural and policy-induced determinants of vulnerability is
rtificial and does not fit with our understanding of exposure
nd resilience.
We believe that a suitable formula to summarise the fore-
oing, decomposing vulnerability into its constituent parts, is:
ulnerability =  probability of shocks ×  (exposure −  resilience)
This expression differs from earlier proposals such as te Velde
2009) and ODI (2010: 32), which put forward that ‘vulnerability
quals exposure minus resilience’. Including the shock compo-
ent is important for a proper understanding of vulnerability, we
eel, as the extent to which developing countries are at risk of
aving their growth negatively impacted by an external shock,
.e. their degree of vulnerability, crucially depends on the prob-
bility of such a shock occurring in the first place. This may
eem tautological but has often been ignored, or insufficiently
mphasised, in recent writings on developing countries’ crisis
xperience. In the formula we intentionally use the probability
f shocks, rather than shocks per se, to accentuate the stochas-
ic nature of the vulnerability concept; vulnerability, as we (and
thers) have defined it, embodies a risk ex  ante, not a determi-
istic state of affairs (see e.g. Naudé et al., 2009c; Montalbano,
011).
The proposed decomposition allows one to better grasp
fforts made in measuring vulnerability empirically and to
uggest some ways forward (see Section 3.2). Also, it helps
o better structure discussions about different vulnerability-
educing strategies and the development finance instruments that
re associated with such strategies (see Section 3.4).
.2.  Measuring  vulnerability
Attempts to quantify developing countries’ vulnerabil-
ty to shocks go back a long time. Early efforts include
N-commissioned research on indicators for assessing the vul-
erability of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the
roup of Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
Briguglio (1995), for example, constructs a composite vulner-
bility index for SIDS, comprising measures of exposure such
s the ratio of foreign trade (exports and imports) to GDP. In
ollow-up work, variables capturing export concentration and
ependence of strategic imports were added to SIDS indices (see
lso Atkins et al., 2000). Likewise, in 1999 the UN introduced
n economic vulnerability index (EVI) as one of the criteria
or identification of LDCs (Committee for Development Policy,
999). This EVI combines exposure (e.g. merchandise export
oncentration) with shock indicators (e.g. instability of exports
f goods and services) by simple arithmetic averaging with equal
eights; a method that may unduly complicate interpretation.
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Guillaumont (2009) acknowledges the problems with the
xisting EVI and proposes a number of alternative aggregation
ethodologies, including using geometric averaging of shock
nd exposure indices to account for multiplicative effects. Such
uggestions are very much in line with our proposed vulnerabil-
ty formula, although they leave out the resilience component.
onversely, Briguglio et al. (2009) bring together an index
f exposure with one of economic resilience; the latter con-
ists of variables on the macroeconomic and fiscal outlook
f countries, market efficiency, good governance and social
evelopment. Recently, in light of the crisis, Naudé (2010) has
pdated Briguglio et al.’s exposure and resilience indices for
ub-Saharan Africa, supplementing the former with measures
f external indebtedness, private sector credit and cross-border
anking liabilities. Both papers however neglect to quantify (the
robability of) shocks in their empirical analysis.
Measuring vulnerability has not been limited to SIDS and
DCs. The end of the 1990s and early 2000s, a period marked by
ultiple crises in emerging markets, also saw increased interest
n early warning models, designed to identify the indicators that
ould best predict the incidence of a crisis. To the extent that
uch crisis incidence is defined in terms of drops in a country’s
utput (see e.g. Ghosh and Ghosh, 2003), early warning models
ould be seen as estimating vulnerability (in the sense we have
efined it above) on the basis of indicators of country exposure
nd resilience. Much of the early warning literature, however,
as focused rather narrowly on sudden stops of capital inflows
nto (selected) emerging market economies, leaving aside trade-
elated shocks.17
The most comprehensive and systematic approach to mea-
uring and monitoring developing country vulnerability today is
mbodied by the IMF’s Vulnerability Exercises for low-income
ountries (VE-LIC) and emerging economies (VEE), respec-
ively (see IMF, 2011a, 2010b: Box 1).18 The VE-LIC gives
ttention to all three vulnerability components we have identi-
ed (although it does not always use the exact same wording):
xposure, resilience and the probability of shocks. It does so
hrough two complementary modules.
First, in order to build an index capturing exposure and
esilience indicators, the VE-LIC identifies a shock event as the
ccurrence of an annual percentage change in one or more of the
elevant variables, i.e. external demand, terms-of-trade, FDI, aid
nd remittances (all expressed as ratios to GDP), that falls below
he bottom decile of the historical country-specific frequency
istribution of such changes for the variables considered. Outhese exercises are now part of the much broader IMF and Financial Stability
oard (FSB)’s joint Early Warning Exercise (EWE), the development of which
tarted late-2008, just when the crisis had entered a new, global phase (see IMF,
010d for a detailed overview of the EWE).
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re marked as crisis episodes. The VE-LIC then determines for
ach potential exposure or resilience indicator individually a
hreshold value that minimises Type I (false alarm) and Type II
missed call) errors in separating crisis episodes from non-crisis
pisodes. Indicator values are mapped into 0–1 scores according
o these thresholds and aggregated to an overall ‘growth decline
ulnerability index’ (with weights of the individual indicators
iven by their relative goodness-of-fit). The overall index is in
urn used to classify countries into categories of high, medium
nd low vulnerability by comparing the index to certain cut-
ff values. The VEE follows a similar methodology, but differs
rom the VE-LIC in terms of the shock variables and expo-
ure/resilience indicators taken into consideration (and the fact
hat it is conducted semi-annually).
Whereas the just-described non-parametric strategy can
ccommodate data availability differences across variables, it
oes not allow for interaction effects among these variables.
his could be problematic as a large external debt exposure, for
xample, may not contribute much to a country’s vulnerability
hen sufficient foreign reserves are held. Also, looking at the
ifferent indicators attempted in the VE-LIC, we observe a great
umber of resilience-related measures (variables on reserve cov-
rs, institutional quality and fiscal balances) but few exposure
easures.19 In this respect, there are perhaps lessons to be
earned from the earlier-cited research on SIDS and LDCs.
The second module of the VE-LIC (and VEE) focuses on
he shocks component of vulnerability in using an elaborate
et of scenario analysis and spill-over modelling techniques to
dentify tail risks and to approximate their potential impact on
eveloping countries. The specific scenarios that are studied are
nformed by the IMF’s research contained in its World Eco-
omic Outlook (WEO) and Global Financial Stability Report
GFSR) and will vary between different rounds of the exercise.
n the first VE-LIC, concluded late 2011, one of the scenarios
nvolved simulating the effect of bank recapitalisation on global
rowth and associated changes in global commodity prices mak-
ng use of advanced DSGE and VAR models. Combining these
imulated effects with information on trading patterns enabled
ranslation into individual countries terms-of-trade changes (see
MF, 2011b).
We believe that by including a module on global risks and
hocks the IMF’s Vulnerability Exercises constitute an important
mprovement over other vulnerability research, drawing atten-
ion to a crucial but seldom specified component of developing
ountry vulnerability. Perhaps there is still room to make the
hock component even more explicit. Clearly, assigning pre-
ise probabilities to all possible scenarios and shock events is
n impossible task. However, one could attempt to estimate the
ikelihood of a limited number of states of the world economy
nd use the outcome of such estimations to construct a weighted
verage of indices combining relevant exposure and resilience
easures for each of these states. Recent Markov-switching
19 Similar concerns were recently voiced by ODI’s Isabella Massa in a joint
DI-IMF roundtable discussion of the VE-LIC (see http://www.odi.org.uk/
vents/docs/4874.pdf).
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odels that can calculate the probability of being in a regime
arked by a given level of volatility (and hence a given likeli-
ood of shocks) offer a promising avenue for further research
ere (see e.g. González-Hermosillo and Hesse, 2009).20
From the foregoing discussion it seems that constructing an
mpirical vulnerability measure that fits our newly proposed
ormula would require combining information from the IMF’s
E-LIC/VEE (on potential shocks and factors of resilience)
nd from sources such as Guillaumont (2009), Briguglio et al.
2009) and Naudé (2010) (which give due attention also to the
xposure dimension of vulnerability and consider it jointly with
esilience). One important problem with such an approach is
hat the results of both the VE-LIC and VEE are not made pub-
icly available, at least not on the level of individual developing
ountries, the main reason for this being market sensitiv-
ty. According to the IMF (2011a: 23), even for low-income
ountries the publication of VE results could have perverse
epercussions, in the spheres of private capital flows, donor
ssistance and domestic debt markets, for example. Replicating
part of) the VE-LIC/VEE results for a reasonable number of
ountries is moreover complicated by the gaps in historical data
ne encounters in readily accessible databases such as the IMF’s
wn WEO database. In order to overcome these data availability
roblems substantial additional research is warranted. This falls
utside the scope of the current paper.
Now that the initial theoretical framework and associated
easurement issues have been laid out, it is important to see
hy vulnerability matters that much for developing countries.
.3.  Vulnerability  to  shocks  as  a development  concern
It is well-established in the literature that, historically, output
olatility has been considerably higher in developing countries
han in the developed, industrialised world. This observation has
otivated research into output volatility’s underlying causes,
ncluding the importance of exogenous shocks. Perry (2009)
stimates that over the period 1970–2005 about 44% of the
excess’ output volatility of developing countries, defined as
he standard deviation of GDP per capita from its trend and
easured against the benchmark of industrial country output
olatility, is due to external shocks in capital flows and terms
f trade. Raddatz (2007) on the contrary argues that external
hocks, while non-trivial, cannot account for more than 11%
f the overall variance of real GDP per capita in low-income
ountries (for the period 1965–1997); endogenous factors make
p the remaining 89%. In further work, the same author how-
ver finds that for Sub-Saharan developing countries the relative
mportance of external shocks as a source of output volatility has
ncreased in the post-1990 period, mainly because of greater
nternal stability and a greater sensitivity of output growth to
hocks (Raddatz, 2008). Becker and Mauro (2006) show that
he majority of severe ‘output drops’ during 1971–2001, events
20 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting Markov-switching tech-
iques as one potential way forward in measuring vulnerability empirically.
or a general introduction to such models, see Hamilton (2008).
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(4)
External shocks
(input volatility) Output volatility Consumption volatility
Lower long -term growth Increased inequality
Lower poverty reduction
(1) (2)
(3)
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hat last at least two years and for which the output loss is
% or more of pre-event GDP per capita, also coincide with
t least one shock, often sudden stops (in emerging markets) or
erms-of-trade shocks (in other developing countries).
As we have shown, the crisis that affected most develop-
ng countries’ growth from 2008 onwards is another example
f the potentially detrimental impact of (a wave of) truly
xogenous shocks. Recent studies have furthermore attributed
ross-country differences in growth during the crisis to factors
f exposure to these shocks, such as overall trade openness
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011) and export linkages (Berg et al.,
011), and factors of resilience, e.g. foreign exchange reserves
overage (Didier et al., 2011).
Macro-economic output volatility, and by extension severe
utput drops (at least partly the result of shocks), have been
ound to have significant welfare effects in developing countries,
oth through direct and indirect channels (see Loayza et al.,
007; Perry, 2009). First, output volatility is reflected in even
igher consumption volatility in most of these countries, as deep
nancial markets or domestic policies conducive to consumption
moothening are often lacking.
Second, in their seminal study Ramey and Ramey (1995)
emonstrate that countries with higher output volatility during
he years 1960–1985 on average had lower mean growth. These
ndings are corroborated by Hnatkovska and Loayza (2003)
hich uncover a strong negative causal relationship between
olatility and growth for 1960–2000 and show that it is primarily
crisis volatility’, negative fluctuations beyond a certain thresh-
ld, that harms long-run growth (see also Kharroubi, 2007).21
Third, aggregate output volatility is positively related to
nequality; especially large output drops have long-lasting asym-
etric consequences (i.e. effects not reversed by subsequent
utput booms) on income distribution in low-income countries
see Calderón and Levy Yeyati, 2009; Laursen and Mahajan,
005). Higher inequality may further hamper the poverty reduc-
ion potential of (already reduced) economic growth. Indeed,
ourguignon (2003) and Ravallion (2004), among others, have
uggested that inequality impacts negatively on the growth elas-
icity of poverty reduction.22
Fig. 1 summarises the foregoing reasoning in a stylised (and
navoidably very crude) way: external shocks, a form of input
olatility, are a source of output volatility in developing countries
1); output volatility translates into consumption volatility (2),
educes long-term growth (3) and is associated with increased
ncome inequality (4); and lower growth in combination with
igher inequality is in turn detrimental to poverty reduction
fforts (5 and 6). Developing country vulnerability to exter-
al shocks thus needs to be addressed if we are serious about
21 Kose et al. (2005) argue that, because of progressive globalisation, the
olatility-growth relation has changed over time and differs across country
roupings.
22 Guillaumont and Korachais (2010) demonstrate that the negative effect of
utput’s deviation from its trend on poverty reduction for a given growth rate
uns through distributional effects that go beyond simple changes in the Gini
oefficient.
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rig. 1. Why vulnerability to shocks matters for development. Logical framework
ased on references cited in the text.
evelopment. The next subsection discusses some of the differ-
nt conceivable options in a structured manner.
.4.  Classifying  and  evaluating  ways  of  dealing  with
ulnerability
From the formula proposed in Section 3.1 we can logically
nfer that in order to bring down developing country vulnera-
ility, external shock probability would have to be diminished,
ountry exposure would have to be reduced, and/or resilience to
hocks would need to be built. First, without any shocks occur-
ing (or better, with zero shock probability), no country can be
onsidered vulnerable, of course. Second, a country which is
hielded from all external shocks, i.e. has zero exposure, is also
on-vulnerable. And third, countries which are greatly exposed
o considerable shocks need not to be highly vulnerable; an
qually great resilience would cancel out their exposure.
Bringing down the probability of shocks is often one of the
implicitly) intended outcomes of proposals for a more stable
nd robust global financial and monetary system. For example,
 recent report by the Palais-Royal Initiative (2011), an infor-
al group composed of former government officials, central
ankers and international organisation staff, lays out an exten-
ive and very ambitious reform agenda to come to such a system;
ncluding the need for adjustments to global current account
mbalances, limiting speculative capital flows and excessive
xchange rate fluctuations, and stronger multilateral surveillance
f national economic and financial policies. This would cer-
ainly go some way in reducing the occurrence of shocks and/or
ontaining shocks before they spread out.
Many of the proposed reforms require close cooperation and
oncerted action at the global level, whether through existing
nstitutions, such as the IMF, G-20, FSB and WTO, or new con-
gurations. Developing countries will need greater saying in
hese institutions if the reformed global financial and monetary
ystem is to be made more inclusive and development-friendly
Ocampo, 2011). As the ongoing quota and governance changes
t the IMF suggest, enhancing the voice of developing countries
s a slow-moving and highly political process. Further explo-
ation of these issues, while of utmost importance, transcends
he scope of this paper. Rather, in what follows, we will zoom
n on the two components of vulnerability over which devel-
ping countries have arguably more control, i.e. exposure and
esilience.
70 D. Essers / Review of Development Finance 3 (2013) 61–83
Table 2
Dealing with developing country vulnerability to external shocks. Author’s adaptation from Perry (2009) and Cassimon and Verbeke (2009).
Shock Action
Coping Prevention Self-insurance Market insurance/hedging
External demand/terms-of-trade Balance of payments and
fiscal adjustment;
exceptional aid
Export diversification;
countercyclical aid
Reserves hoarding;
stabilisation funds; other
sovereign wealth funds
Commodity price
derivatives; indexed debt
(commodity prices/terms
of trade); other contingent
credit lines
Private capital flows Balance of payments and
fiscal adjustment;
exceptional aid
Capital portfolio
diversification; capital
controls; local capital
market development;
countercyclical aid
Reserves hoarding Currency/interest rate
derivatives; indexed debt
(GDP); local currency
external debt; other
contingent credit lines
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(Table 2, adapted from Perry (2009) and Cassimon and
erbeke (2009), provides a particularly useful framework to
lassify different ways of dealing with vulnerability to exter-
al shocks.23 The analysis will be restricted to trade shocks,
oth in external demand and terms-of-trade dimensions, and
rivate capital flow shocks, the two best-documented (and most
mportant) transmission channels of the global crisis to devel-
ping countries (see Section 2.2). While Table 2 is by no means
xhaustive, it does present a wide and interesting pallet of inter-
entions.
Broadly speaking, one can identify four possible strategies.
irst, as the default option, countries may choose not to address
heir vulnerability to shocks beforehand; neither do they reduce
xposure, nor do they strengthen their resilience. Vulnerabil-
ty as we have conceptualised it in Section 3.1 thus remains
nchanged. Countries wait for the shock(s) to occur and then
ope with the aftermath. Such coping typically involves bal-
nce of payments adjustment, such as reducing net imports or
sing up international reserves, and procyclical fiscal behaviour,
.g. cutting expenditures and increasing taxes during periods of
risis. With large shocks, this may well result in a destruction
f country income and wealth and an increase in poverty. Pro-
yclicality could moreover amplify the impact of shocks and
tall the recovery process (Perry, 2009). Of course, international
ctors such as the IMF, World Bank, regional development banks
nd bilateral donors can help softening a country’s adjustment
23 Perry’s (2009) framework, inspired by the insurance literature, was origi-
ally developed to classify different ways of managing volatility, rather than
ulnerability to external shocks as such, and with a strong focus on the potential
ole of multilateral development banks. In this paper we take a somewhat dif-
erent approach by linking the different categories of interventions devised by
erry to a new formula for developing country vulnerability, with ample atten-
ion to the roles of both countries themselves and international organisations
multilateral development banks and the IMF) (see Section 4). Also, we provide
 thorough update of Perry’s work and include a number of additional instru-
ents, such as capital controls and sovereign wealth funds, that have received
ncreased academic and policy interest only after the crisis entered its worst
hase (as mentioned in its preface, Perry’s (2009) first full draft was finished
efore the Lehman bankruptcy).
i
s
d
a
t
d
m
(
o
i
c
arocess by providing exceptional financing, both extra loans and
mergency aid grants.24
Coping with shocks like those in the global crisis is often
ainful in both financial and human terms and, as a strategy of
ait-and-see, it is inherently backward-looking. Nevertheless,
or some low-income countries it represents the only possible
ay of dealing with their vulnerability (see further).
Second, countries may attempt to work on prevention,
eaning impeding external shocks from contaminating their
conomies. Linking back to our proposed vulnerability formula,
revention can be seen as a strategy of bringing down vulnerabil-
ty by reducing exposure to shocks. With respect to trade shocks,
robably the most prescribed prevention tactic is the diversifi-
ation of exports. Expanding the range of export products, and
o a lesser extent of export partners/markets, has been found
o moderate the positive relation between overall trade open-
ess and growth volatility for developing countries, by shielding
hese economies from adverse external shocks (see Haddad et al.,
010).
In a similar vein, capital portfolio diversification, in terms of
eeking different forms of financing (debt versus equity), cur-
encies and maturities, can be assumed to lower the risk of a
ountry experiencing serious capital flow shocks. Caner et al.
2009), for example, find that liability dollarization in emerg-
ng countries has typically increased the probability of a sudden
top of capital flows, while higher FDI inflows have tended to
ecrease it.25
Due to financial market imperfections, developing countries
re however not always able to borrow abroad in their domes-
ic currency, and neither can they access long-term financing
omestically, leaving them the choice between currency and
aturity mismatches. This is what Eichengreen and Hausmann
1999) have referred to as the ‘original sin’ dilemma. The devel-
pment of deep and long-term local currency markets (domestic
24 As noted by Cassimon and Verbeke (2009: 6), a key issue here is determin-
ng the actual burden sharing between the country itself and the international
ommunity; in other words: ‘who pays the ferryman?’.
25 The latter effect is however insignificant. The shock robustness of FDI has
lso been partly discredited by the global crisis (see Section 2.2.2).
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GDP growth turns out to be lower than projected and increas-
ing those payments when GDP growth develops positively. This
could in turn lower the likelihood of debt overhang and crises
26 We mention only a few examples out of the almost infinite variety of market
insurance and hedging strategies that exists.
27 Lu and Neftci (2008) show that for countries the cost of standard commodity
put options can be cut by simultaneously selling call options on that commodity.
An alternative to such a risk reversal approach are so-called ‘barrier’ option struc-
tures in which options automatically cease to exist if the price of the underlyingD. Essers / Review of Devel
r regional) is believed to enable governments and firms to
. . .optimize the currency composition of their debt, weighing
elative costs, maturities and risks’ (Perry, 2009: 16).
A more drastic preventive measure against capital flow
hocks is that of imposing capital controls, regulating more
irectly the in- and outflow of (speculative) foreign money. In
tudying 195 crisis episodes in 91 developing countries over
970–2007, Gupta et al. (2007) find that output drops were sig-
ificantly lower if capital controls existed at the time the crisis
rupted. Again, multilateral and bilateral donors may contribute
o developing countries’ own efforts; they could, for example,
ttempt to partly offset procyclical export earnings and private
apital flows with countercyclical aid.
Prevention through diversification, rather than disengage-
ent from external finance and trade, would perhaps classify
s a first-best strategy to reduce the vulnerability of developing
ountries, were it not that it is a gradual, longer-term pro-
ess which takes often decades to deliver noticeable pay-offs.
ountries may need quicker solutions.
A third strategy for countries is self-insurance  against exter-
al shocks: saving up in good times, especially during positive
hocks such as temporary commodity booms or capital flow
urges, and then employing the accumulated resources when a
egative shock hits. Within our theoretical framework such an
pproach is to be seen as increasing a country’s ability to with-
tand or adjust quickly from negative shocks, i.e. a strategy of
uilding resilience.
The hoarding of foreign exchange reserves could well prove
elpful as buffer mechanism in reacting to speculative attacks on
urrencies, enabling the implementation of countercyclical fis-
al policies, or providing the liquidity needed to keep economic
ctivity going during a credit crunch. Reserves are traditionally
eployed in liquid (readily available) low-yielding and low-risk
oreign currency assets such as US Treasury bills. Sometimes
hey are devoted to sovereign wealth funds, entities that are typi-
ally managed outside central banks and which can take different
hapes (see IMF, 2008b). One form is that of a stabilisation fund
esigned to smoothen out, in the medium-term, export earnings
ccumulated during periods of favourable commodity prices.
lternatively, countries may establish sovereign wealth funds
hat invest part of (excess) reserves in a wider spectrum of high-
ielding but riskier assets, in view of enhancing returns over
onger periods (but at the expense of liquidity).
Self-insurance however comes at a large opportunity cost
nder the form of foregone investment in economic growth and
ong-term development (Ruiz and Molina, 2010). The cost of
arry is generally expressed as the spread between the return
n (liquid) reserve assets and the external cost of funds. Rodrik
2006) finds that reserves accumulation, although it involves
 significant insurance premium, is not irrational for develop-
ng countries that face the risk of costly financial crises. Levy
eyati (2008) adds that, for emerging countries at least, the cost
f self-insurance is often overstated, taking into consideration
hat an increase in reserves decreases the spread to be paid on the
ull sovereign debt stock. Others contend that while amassing
eserves reduces the costs associated with shocks and instabil-
ty for an individual country, such practices, at least under the
a
(
cnt Finance 3 (2013) 61–83 71
urrent global reserve system, may well increase global  instabil-
ty if practised on a greater scale (see e.g. Stiglitz, 2006: 254).
he underlying reasoning, which invokes the Triffin dilemma
nder the Bretton-Woods system, is that the country issuing
he main reserve currency (nowadays still predominantly the
S) will get increasingly into debt by growing demand for safe
ssets, up to a point where confidence in the reserve currency
alters; this of course poses a serious threat to those countries
olding the reserves.
Fourth and last, countries may rely on market  insurance
nd/or hedging  mechanisms.26 The former refers to market-
ased instruments that allow a country to keep the upside
otential when certain market variables change, while reduc-
ng the downside risk at the cost of an up-front paid premium;
he latter concerns instruments that eliminate downside risk at
he expense of losing the upside potential (Abousleiman et al.,
007: 38–39). This fourth category of possible interventions, as
 market-based alternative to self-insurance, can also be under-
tood as building resilience.
Market insurance against shocks is typically related to the use
f options. A developing country that depends heavily on the
xport of a certain commodity could buy put options that would
ive it the right (but not the obligation) to sell that commodity at
 set minimum price. If the commodity price evolves favourably
nd exceeds the strike price of the put, the option contact would
ot be executed and countries would simply enjoy the higher
xport earnings. In a similar fashion, call options can be used
o insure countries against unfavourable price hikes of strategic
mports (such as oil).27 The same logic also applies to currency
nd interest rate options.
Typical hedging instruments, on the other hand, are future
r forward contracts whereby buyer and seller agree (and are
bliged) to exchange an asset at a specified future point in time
t a price that is fixed today (Hull, 2005).28 The use of futures
nd forwards could thus reduce country balance-of-payment and
udget uncertainty (Abousleiman et al., 2007). Again, hedging
an be applied to commodities, currencies and interest rates.
Arguably, indexed debt instruments also fall within the cat-
gory of market insurance and hedging (having comparable
isk-sharing features), although they cannot always be clearly
ssigned to one or the other. GDP-indexed bond issuance would
elp countries to keep their debt-to-GDP ratios within a nar-
ower range by automatically reducing debt payments whensset (commodity) hits a predetermined barrier value.
28 Forwards differ from futures in that futures are typically exchange-traded
rather than over-the-counter, directly between two parties) and margined with
ollateral to be deposited in advance (see Hull, 2005).
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n the country and, of more relevance here, lessen the need
or procyclical (fiscal) policies (Borenzstein and Mauro, 2004;
riffith-Jones and Sharma, 2006). Debt indexed to the prices of
ommodities on which developing countries depend for foreign
xchange, or more generally to their terms of trade, are deemed
o have similar effects (Caballero, 2002; Atta-Mensah, 2004).
International financial institutions from their side could pos-
ibly help countries in insuring/hedging various risks by offering
inflation-indexed) local currency-denominated credit or mak-
ng their grant/loan financing contingent on the occurrence of
xternal shocks, for example by means of trigger criteria or
hresholds (see Martin and Bargawi, 2005).29
Once more, it is important to take note of a number of chal-
enges inherent to strategies of market insurance and hedging.
ption contracts require the up-front payment of a (possibly
izeable) premium, which may be hard to sell politically, espe-
ially if shocks turn out to be not as severe as expected. Likewise,
utures and forwards can offer protection from volatility in
xport prices but in doing so may exclude countries from enjoy-
ng potential (commodity) price booms (Abousleiman et al.,
007). Indexed debt and other contingent financing may suffer
rom moral hazard (a typical insurance problem) as countries
ould seem to have an incentive to disregard growth-oriented
olicies or misrepresent their growth/terms-of-trade statistics
Borenzstein and Mauro, 2004). With regards to contingent
redit provision, the IMF (2011c) also stresses the trade-off
etween predictability (removing uncertainty about how much
nancing will become available in case of a shock) and speci-
city (tailoring that financing to the needs stemming from a
hock). Most notably, the creation of markets for new financial
nstruments entails considerable first-mover costs and coordi-
ation problems, whilst the management of such instruments
as high institutional and technical capacity requirements (see
laessens, 2005; Perry, 2009). As a result, many of the deriva-
ives mentioned here are not or only restrictedly available for
eveloping (especially low-income) countries, often those that
eed the instruments most because of their large exposure to
hocks.
As is clear from the above, all four approaches to deal with
ulnerability have their advantages as well as important draw-
acks. The different categories presented should however not
e interpreted as being absolute; neither do the listed interven-
ions stand in isolation from each other. Important substitution
ffects and synergies are not to be overlooked. For example,
arket insurance, by reducing vulnerability to shocks, may
ell lead a country government to favour ‘enhancing’ reformsimed at productivity growth (such as increased openness) over
buffering’ reforms (such as capital controls or reserves accumu-
ation) (Cordella and Levy Yeyati, 2004).30 On the other hand,
29 As indicated by Abousleiman et al. (2007), such contingent credit lines are
o perfect substitute to purely market-based insurance since they transfer risks
cross periods rather than across good and bad states. Contingent loans also need
o be repaid eventually, unlike insurance disbursements.
30 This is because the former type of reforms pays off relatively more in good
imes and relatively less in bad times, while the latter type of reforms does
recisely the opposite (see Cordella and Levy Yeyati, 2004).
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ngaging in preventive measures such as export or capital portfo-
io diversification can bring down the costs of market insurance
or a country (Perry, 2009).
The aptness of different strategies to deal with vulnerability,
r a mix thereof, depends to a large extent on three factors: the
ature of the shock(s), the country’s unique characteristics, and
he timeframe one seeks to adopt.
First, coping may dominate other strategies in case of rare
nd low-expected-cost shocks, while high-frequency events with
 high expected cost would put more emphasis on prevention
Perry, 2009). If shocks are rare and costly, as those associated
ith the global crisis arguably, the balance of optimal responses
ilts more towards market insurance and hedging.
Second, what works for one country is not necessarily helpful
or another. Indeed, academics and development professionals
ave come a long way to denounce the one-size-fits-all logic
nderlying the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) advo-
ated by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s and early
990s. Countries differ in their natural resource endowments,
conomic and institutional structure, technical capabilities and
olitical configurations, which has real implications for the
esirability and feasibility of certain interventions.
Third, the most favourable choice of strategy is not fixed
ut rather dynamic, evolving over time. In the very short run,
oping with the aftermath of a shock may be the only possi-
le strategy. Self- and market-based insurance (and hedging)
ecome available and potentially more attractive options in the
edium term. Only over a longer period of time, (first-best) pre-
entive measures such as diversification and local capital market
evelopment hold promises.
Taking the foregoing into consideration, we argue for a multi-
ayered ‘therapy’, combining the different approaches to deal
ith vulnerability in a dynamic manner and with attention to
ountry specifics. As our analysis has indicated, there are roles
o play for both developing countries themselves and the inter-
ational community. In the next section, we provide anecdotal
vidence on the course followed by countries and multilateral
evelopment banks and the IMF, respectively, in dealing with
ulnerability to external shocks before and during the global
risis, structured along Perry’s (2009) four-category taxonomy.
lthough much more research is needed (and indeed, being
ndertaken) beyond what we present, our short exposition will
ighlight a number of achievements as well as locate some exist-
ng sore points in national and international attempts to reduce
ulnerability to shocks. This allows us to distil some tentative
essons for the future (see Section 5).
.  How  vulnerability  has  been  dealt  with.  .  .
.1.  .  . .by  countries  themselves
.1.1.  Prevention
Developing countries’ overall success with respect to pre-ention, i.e. reducing vulnerability through limiting exposure to
xternal shocks of various kinds, has been limited, as witnessed
y the transmission of the crisis through channels of trade and
rivate capital flows (Section 2.2). Many, especially low-income
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ountries still depend for their exports on a small, undiversified
asket of commodities or low value-added manufactures, most
f which are very sensitive to world market demand movements.
etween 2000 and 2008, Herfindahl–Hirshmann export concen-
ration indices31 only slightly improved in a number of South and
outh-East Asian economies and even worsened in most Central
nd East African and South American countries (see UNCTAD,
009: 200–207). Of course, there are some laudable exceptions
o these general trends. Countries like Kenya and Chile have over
he years developed successful non-traditional export (NTE) sec-
ors, such as the cut flower and seafood industry, respectively
see e.g. ODI, 2010).
Diversification of trade partners has also been a rather slow
rocess. In 2008, 46.7% of total developing country export
alue was going to traditional developed economies, not much
ower than the 50.9% in 2005 and 54.1% in 1995 (UNCTAD,
009: 80).32 This is not to say that trade links with fast-growing
merging markets such as China and India did not help some
ow-income countries, e.g. Zambia, the DR Congo and Sudan,
n avoiding worst-case scenarios (see Samake and Yang, 2011;
DI, 2010). It could however be argued that while China and
ndia’s thirst for raw materials may have benefited poor devel-
ping countries in diversifying their export markets, it has not
upported the latter in moving up the global value chain, thus
otentially locking in their export dependence on volatile and
risis-prone commodities (The Economist, 2010).
Prevention through capital portfolio diversification has been
 more promising but insufficient and uneven process thus far.
s is well known, international financial integration, which can
e expressed de  facto  as the ratio of the sum of all foreign
nancial assets and liabilities to GDP, has been on the rise
n developing countries, especially in recent years (see Lane
nd Milesi-Ferretti, 2009), leaving many countries now more
xposed to capital flow shocks. The share of FDI, which has
roven to be at least slightly more shock-proof than portfo-
io equity and debt financing (see Section 2.2.2), in developing
ountries’ stock of external liabilities has been growing steadily
ince the 1990s (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2009). Again,
here is evidence suggesting that emerging market FDI may
ave served as a more crisis-robust alternative to typical Western
ources of investment in a number of low-income countries (see
DI, 2010).
Looking at overall outstanding external debt, one observeshat short-term debt had been gaining importance within total
xternal debt stocks of developing countries in the years leading
p to the crisis (from 13.5% in 2000 to 23.4% in 2007). The
31 di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) propose an interesting alternative to
he traditional Herfindahl–Hirshmann index, taking into account not only the
umber and share of different sectors in a country’s export structure but also
he riskiness of each of these sectors. They show that this alternative measure
s strongly correlated with the input (terms-of-trade) and output volatility of
ountries.
32 For Africa, 60.6% of export value ended up on developed country markets
n 2008, compared to 64.1% in 2005 and 62.6% in 1995. Intra-African exports
ccounted for 11.1% of total African exports in 2008, where this was 18.2% in
995 (UNCTAD, 2009: 84–85).
m
o
n
fi
C
c
A
a
s
I
Cnt Finance 3 (2013) 61–83 73
ion share of developing countries’ public and publicly guaran-
eed external debt, about 90%, is nowadays still denominated in
ne of the three dominant foreign currencies, mainly US dollar
around 66% in 2009) and to a lesser extent euro (15%) and yen
10%) (World Bank, 2011).
In the past, capital controls have had some success in altering
he maturity structure and composition of capital portfolios
often without affecting the overall volume of inflows), most
otably in Chile that implemented an unremunerated reserve
equirement from 1991 to 1998 (see De Gregorio et al., 2000).
stry et al. (2010) find that countries which had capital controls
on debt inflows) in place prior to the global financial crisis also
uffered lower output declines. Nevertheless, making abstrac-
ion of regional and country differences, developing countries’
verall use of such controls has gradually diminished over time
see Chinn and Ito’s (2009) KAOPEN index of de  jure  financial
penness).33
In view of liquidity and currency risks on their balance sheets,
 number of emerging economies have, since long time, under-
aken efforts to develop long-term local capital markets in their
omestic currencies (see Perry, 2009). In fact, in most important
merging economies (particularly those in Asia) the issuance of
ocal currency bonds and notes has risen more than proportion-
lly to GDP and now greatly exceeds that of foreign currency
ecurities (BIS, 2007).34 End-2008 the total market of emerging
ountry local currency bonds was estimated at the equivalent of
S$5.5 trillion (Dalla and Hesse, 2009).
Local currency bonds have also been issued increasingly
n international markets, although foreign participation is still
ery limited (see Burger et al., 2009). Hausmann and Panizza
2010) therefore conclude that while emerging markets have
argely overcome their domestic original sins, thanks to deep-
ning domestic bond markets, they have not yet been able to
se these markets to borrow from foreigners in local currency;
nternational original sins have not yet been eliminated.
Several other qualifications apply. Most importantly, local
urrency markets are still predominantly an emerging country
atter. Only a few low- and lower middle-income countries
e.g. Kenya and Ghana) have developed deep and liquid
omestic bond markets of any significance as they often face
evere capacity and regulatory challenges (see Adelegan and
adzewicz-Bak, 2009; Jefferis, 2009). Moreover, the latest
vailable evidence indicates that, even in emerging markets,
any local currency bond markets have not yet reached the stage
f providing liquidity that holds up well during a major inter-
ational financial shock. Recovery in these markets was, on the
33 Notable exceptions are a number of (South-East) Asian countries in which
nancial openness was restricted following the 1997–1998 financial crisis (see
hinn and Ito, 2009).
34 One remarkable initiative, aimed at broadening the investor base and over-
oming other impediments to local and regional capital market development in
sia, is the Asian Bond Fund, conceived in 2005 by a number of East Asian
nd Pacific central banks. This US$2 billion fund has invested in local currency
overeign and quasi-sovereign bonds in eight Asian markets: China, Hong Kong,
ndonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (see
han et al., 2011).
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Another notable evolution has been the increasing regional
cooperation in foreign reserves management. Two examples are
the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), an arrangement of reserves
36 These current account surpluses in some (emerging) countries have been
mirrored by current account deficits in other (developed) countries, leading to a4 D. Essers / Review of Devel
ther hand, fairly quick. Diversification of the domestic investor
ase away from banks, which are now the main holders of local
urrency bonds, could perhaps further reduce exposure to shocks
see Turner, 2009).
.1.2.  Market  insurance  and  hedging
While global derivative markets for country insurance and
edging instruments have grown exponentially in recent years
before the crisis at least), the participation of developing
ountries is still marginal. According to Saxena and Villar
2008), the daily average turnover of over-the-counter currency
nd interest rate derivative products in emerging markets was
S$516 billion in 2007 or at most 13% of the world total (around
S$4 trillion).35 Taking out the high-income financial centres
ong Kong and Singapore leaves only a turnover of US$146
illion.
Similarly, most developing countries do not extensively
se commodity derivative markets to insure or hedge them-
elves against adverse commodity price (and thus by extension
erms-of-trade) shocks. In 2006 the share of non-OECD
xchange-traded commodity future and option contracts stood
t approximately 31% of the global number of contracts. How-
ver, almost 80% of these contracts were in developing Asia’s
China and India) agricultural sector (Gross, 2007). Non-OECD
articipation in other sectors (such as the energy and metal sec-
or) and by Latin American and African stakeholders was only
ery minor.
As noted before, political economy problems associated with
aying high up-front insurance fees or forgoing the benefits com-
ng from possible commodity price booms, have surely been
 restraining factor here. Also, most commodity-related finan-
ial products have relative short maturities, with oil and maize
erivatives being notable exceptions (see Abousleiman et al.,
007). This makes the existing types of derivative contracts
ven less attractive for commodity exporters or importers. South
frica, for example, hosting the only derivative market in Sub-
aharan Africa, has seen a rapid increase in currency derivative
roducts. Trade in agricultural commodity (e.g. maize) contracts
n the South African market is however still embryonic (see
delegan, 2009).
Country issuance of indexed debt instruments has been even
ore sporadic in developing countries than the use of options,
utures and forwards. To our knowledge, no aggregate figures
xist on such indexed debt. Most issuances took place in the wake
f debt restructuring processes that followed financial crises and
overeign defaults in emerging countries. Sandleris and Taddei
2007) report on the Argentinean experience with GDP warrants
n 2005 and a number of Brady bonds with ‘value recovery
ights’ linked to GDP (Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
osta Rica) or oil prices (Mexico and Venezuela) in the 1990s.
he design of these instruments was often severely flawed, with
omplex and inappropriate indexation formulas.
35 More than 80% of these derivatives were currency contracts (see Saxena and
illar, 2008).
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.1.3.  Self-insurance
Unlike prevention measures and the use of market-based
erivatives, the strategy of self-insurance through foreign
eserves accumulation has proven popular with developing
ountries, especially from the 1990s onwards. After a series
f major financial crises, East Asian, Latin American and a
umber of oil-exporting countries began amassing war chests
f reserves as a buffer against possible future shocks by running
ver-increasing current account surpluses (sometimes fuelled
y favourable commodity price trends) or by international
orrowing.36 The increase in reserves holdings by developing
ountries has been extraordinary by any standards. End 2008
hey held around US$4.8 trillion worth of reserves (excluding
old) which amounts to more than 65% of the world total (IMF,
010a). China has over time become the undisputed champion,
ccounting for roughly 40% of the reserves accrued by devel-
ping countries in 2008 (World Bank, 2011).
While it would be incorrect to dismiss altogether the mercan-
ilist interpretation that reserves accumulation is a by-product of
n export-led growth (helped by exchange rate interventions),
izenman and Lee (2007) find evidence that precautionary, self-
nsurance motives were far more important in explaining the
bserved hoarding of international reserves during 1980–2000,
ven in the case of China.
Since the holding of excess reserves, classically under the
orm of US Treasury bills, carries significant opportunity costs,
 growing part has been channelled into sovereign wealth funds,
tand-alone government investment vehicles that hold more
iversified global portfolios of higher-yielding assets. Truman
2008) estimates the total size of (non-pension) sovereign wealth
unds for 2008 at around US$2.9 trillion globally, of which at
east US$2.2 trillion was in hands of developing (mostly emerg-
ng) country governments.37 Sovereign wealth funds are very
eterogeneous in terms of the source of finances (commodity
ersus non-commodity), governance structure and overall objec-
ives, which in turn influences their investment profile. Kunzel
t al. (2011) shows that sovereign wealth funds themselves were
ffected by the crisis, especially those with longer investment
orizons, and that this has sparked debates about their strategic
sset allocations. Whereas before the crisis, developed countries,
nd the United States in particular, were the main recipients of
overeign wealth funds’ investments, attention may now gradu-
lly turn towards developing countries’ assets (Curto, 2010).ituation of global imbalances. See e.g. Bernanke (2005) on the global savings
lut hypothesis.
37 These figures are on the whole additional to the aforementioned reserves
oldings and include the sovereign wealth funds of Algeria, Azerbaijan,
otswana, Brunei, Chile, China, Gabon, Hong Kong, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kiri-
ati, South Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar,
ussia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, Timor-Leste,
rinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.
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example). However, there seems to be serious doubt on whetherD. Essers / Review of Devel
ooling and bilateral liquidity swaps initiated in 2000 by the
SEAN+3 (see Kohlscheen and Taylor, 2008), and the efforts
f the Latin American Reserves Fund (FLAR) to improve the
onditions of international reserves investments by its member
tates Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay
nd Venezuela (see Carrasquilla, 2007).
How has self-insurance paid off during the crisis? Looking
nto the drawing down of reserves by 20 emerging economies,
izenman and Sun (2009) conclude that only nine of these
ountries, mainly large primary commodity exporters, depleted
heir reserves as part of the adjustment process to the crisis.38 It
s suggested that in these countries exposure to trade shocks was
nternalised before the crisis and that the accumulated reserves
ere released as a buffer when the crisis struck. In the other
1 emerging economies, Aizenman and Sun (2009) argue, pre-
risis reserves hoarding behaviour can be explained largely by
nancial factors such as a greater short-term debt-to-GDP ratio.
he hypothesis, which requires further testing, is that these latter
ountries decided not to draw down much of their reserves out of
ear to induce destabilising speculative attacks. Blanchard et al.
2010) claim that there is no apparent and significant relation-
hip between the amount of reserves held and output declines of
merging countries during the crisis, even when controlling for
ariables such as trade and financial openness. Llaudes et al.
2010) find that pre-crisis reserves holdings did  dampen the
ffect of the crisis on emerging markets’ output, but with the
rotection offered by reserves subject to diminishing returns.
n any case, post-crisis years have seen a further accumulation
f reserves in emerging economies; estimates for end 2010 are
round US$6.3 trillion (see IMF, 2011d).
So far we have not considered the self-insurance experience
f low-income countries, somewhat understandably as these
ountries have often not been able to translate natural resource
rice hikes into significant stocks of reserves. In the DR Congo,
or example, despite favourable prices for its main exports (cop-
er, cobalt, gold, diamond and crude oil) in the years prior to
he crisis, the level of reserves has always been structurally
ow, averaging out at the equivalent of one week of imports
n September 2008. When the global crisis gained momentum,
eserves practically evaporated to less than a day (literally just a
ew hours) of import coverage, leaving the country no choice but
o reduce (vital) imports and seek external assistance (Kabuya
alala and Cassimon, 2010; Cassimon and Verbeke, 2009). This
xample, while certainly extreme, is not an isolated case (see
.g. ODI, 2010). Reserves accumulation (an management) as
 self-insurance strategy for low-income countries, which have
ypically no good access to international capital markets but are
ften very vulnerable to trade shocks, therefore deserves more
ttention in future research..1.4.  Coping
Given sluggish prevention efforts, limited access to and use
f market-based derivatives and typically low reserves levels,
38 These countries did however not lose more than one third of their pre-crisis
eserves stock on average (Aizenman and Sun, 2009).
s
i
pnt Finance 3 (2013) 61–83 75
oping with the crisis has been the only possible alternative for
 large number of low-income developing countries. Some of
hem have quickly and actively pursued countercyclical poli-
ies, similar to the stimulus packages and related measures
mplemented by emerging and advanced economies (te Velde,
009).39 Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, among others, expanded
overnment expenditures and eased monetary policy to aid crisis
ecovery (see Kasekende et al., 2010). In Cambodia, Bangladesh
nd Bolivia, for example, public works and other social transfer
rogrammes were initiated (ODI, 2010). This is positive news
nd signifies a break with the past,40 especially for Sub-Saharan
frica where government expenditures have on average always
een more procyclical than in other developing regions. Greater
scal space than during previous crises, because of health-
er external debt levels and access to concessional financing,
nd improvements in governance are deemed to have played
n important role here (Lledó et al., 2009; Fosu and Naudé,
009).
Nevertheless, not all low-income countries have been equally
ble to react countercyclically. Fiscal space was already heavily
onstrained before the crisis in countries such as the DR
ongo, Zambia and Ghana, ruling out expansionary policies
see Kasekende et al., 2010; ODI, 2010). These countries were
orced to resort to adverse fiscal and balance of payments
djustments, slowing down recovery and with real human devel-
pment effects. Facing a shrinking tax base, the Congolese
overnment imposed new taxes on private sector agents and
ublic enterprises over the course of 2009. Meanwhile, pro-
oor expenditures on health, education and social protection
ere reduced as a percentage of total government spending (see
assimon and Verbeke, 2009). This example reinforces the mes-
age that, in coping with a crisis, policy makers often face a
ension between ‘offsetting adverse short-term impacts and pre-
erving incentives for economic recovery and future growth’
Paci et al., 2009: 14).
Having dwelled on each of the different approaches to deal
ith vulnerability to external shocks from the perspective of
eveloping countries themselves, we now move to an examina-
ion of the efforts made by multilateral development banks and
he IMF in this area.
.2.  .  . .by  multilateral  development  banks  and the  IMF
.2.1.  Prevention
One way in which the international community could, at least
o some degree, prevent external shocks from having an effect
n developing countries is through the provision of counter-
yclical aid, disbursing less in good economic times and more
uring economic slowdown (when private capital flows falter, foruch countercyclicality has materialised in practice. Calculat-
ng correlations between the cyclical components of GDP and
39 Khatiwada (2009) offers a detailed review of the initial G-20 crisis responses.
40 See Kaminsky et al. (2004) for evidence of fiscal and monetary policy
rocyclicality in developing countries during 1960–2003.
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tional since February 2008. TCX operates as a hedge fund
by offering medium to long-term swap agreements that convert
hard currency into local currencies to its shareholders. Rather
43 The IBRD is the branch of the World Bank Group that deals with middle-6 D. Essers / Review of Devel
ultilateral development bank disbursements for sample periods
p to 2006, Perry (2009) finds that, aggregated at the regional
evel, multilateral lending has tended to be procyclical more
ften than countercyclical, except during subperiods of deep and
rolonged crisis (such as the East Asian financial crisis) when
evelopment banks are persuaded by the IMF to join in.41 These
ndings largely corroborate an earlier study by Pallage and Robe
2001) who present evidence on the procyclical behaviour of the
ultilateral component of ODA.
On the other hand, there have been some laudable efforts
y the World Bank and regional development banks in assist-
ng countries with their own preventive measures. Of particular
nterest is the Global Emerging Markets Local Currency Bond
GEMLOC) programme, a World Bank-sponsored US$5 bil-
ion initiative aimed at increasing the investability of sovereign
and corporate) local currency bonds issued by emerging
conomies.42 The initiative covers a private investment man-
gement firm, PIMCO, which promotes bond investment, the
EMX index which serves as a benchmark tool for local cur-
ency bonds, and a range of advisory services offered to bond
ssuers. Initially only about 20 major emerging markets were
onsidered for the initiative, all of which already had rela-
ively developed local currency markets (Perry, 2009). Currently
here are 34 countries eligible for GEMLOC’s advisory services,
ncluding low-income Kenya and Vietnam. GEMLOC comple-
ents other, regional development bank initiatives such as, for
xample, the Asian Development Bank’s support to the Asian
ond Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank’s involve-
ent in the local currency bond issuances of a number of
ountries in the region, and the African Development Bank’s
ngoing plans to establish and take part in a African Domestic
ond Fund (see BIS, 2007; Mulema, 2011).
Another point worth noting is the IMF’s altered position on
he use of capital controls. Whereas capital controls were long
utlawed in the IMF’s promotion of free trade and capital move-
ents in developing countries, a recent IMF staff position note,
rompted by the global crisis, now acknowledges that ‘[f]or both
acroeconomic and prudential reasons . . .there may be circum-
tances in which capital controls are a legitimate component of
he policy response to surges in capital inflows’ (Ostry et al.,
010: 15). This more accommodating stance towards controls is
mportant as it may well broaden developing countries’ future
olicy space in dealing with their vulnerability to shocks. The
uestion is of course whether the IMF will build further on this or
hether it will return to old orthodoxies once commemorations
f the crisis fade.
.2.2.  Market  insurance  and  hedging
Progress on the provision of (market-based) instruments to
ssist developing countries with insurance and hedging against
xternal shocks has so far been slow and biased towards larger
41 Standard IMF lending in itself, which constitutes short-term balance of
ayments support (such as Stand-By Arrangements), can be considered coun-
ercyclical (by definition).
42 See http://www.gemloc.org.
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merging economies. We look at three types of interventions in
ore detail: local currency lending, (currency) derivatives, and
ontingent credit facilities.
First of all, direct local currency lending to developing
ountries, to help the latter eliminate part of their currency mis-
atches, has constituted only a marginal percentage of the total
oans disbursed by international financial institutions (see Perry,
009). With respect to the World Bank, Abousleiman et al.
2007) note that this is a legacy of the past, when the Bank
as operating in a world system of fixed exchange rates, and
eflects institutional inertia. The International Bank of Recon-
truction and Development43 (IBRD)’s articles of agreement
rohibit it from holding open currency positions (but not explic-
tly from retaining other non-credit risks) on its balance sheet.
ny local currency loans thus need to be fully backed by borrow-
ngs in the same currency or hedged using currency swaps. This
akes local currency lending less interesting for the IBRD and
ssentially excludes countries which have not already deep local
urrency markets (where currency swaps exist), arguably those
ountries that would benefit most (Perry, 2009). Restrictions on
nter-American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank
nd African Development Bank local currency lending are very
imilar, in spite of recent local currency initiatives initiated by
hese organisations.44 The IMF, for its part, does not engage in
ocal currency lending.
Second, multilateral development banks do offer possibili-
ies for country insurance and hedging with derivatives. Through
ts Flexible Loan products, the IBRD allows countries to tailor
heir repayment terms, such as grace period, maturity and amor-
isation schedule, beforehand and to use risk management tools
uch as currency and interest rate conversion options (which
an be executed at a certain transaction fee) embedded in these
oans.45 Currency (and interest rate) swaps can also be accessed
n a stand-alone basis by signing a so-called Master Derivatives
greement with the IBRD.46 Again, however, the availability
f these instruments is largely conditional on the existence of
n already sufficiently liquid swap market in the desired local
urrency.
A promising development is that of currency risk diversifica-
ion through global pooling as currently practiced through The
urrency Exchange Fund (TCX), an initiative launched by the
etherlands Development Finance Company and fully opera-
47ncome and creditworthy low-income countries.
44 For the Inter-American Development Bank, see http://www.iadb.org/en/
ews/webstories/2008-04-14/idb-expands-local-currency-financing,4557.html.
45 For more details on the IBRD’s Flexible Loans, see http://treasury.
orldbank.org/bdm/htm/financing.html. The financial products of the major
egional development banks work in a similar way (see e.g. ADB, 2008).
46 Since 1999, the IBRD also offers commodity swaps on a case-by case basis.
bousleiman et al. (2007) report that these have not yet been used by IBRD
lients.
47 See http://www.tcxfund.com/system/files/111201 TCX update.pdf.
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SDR336 million was channelled to six countries that were par-
ticular hard hit by the crisis in FY2009 and SDR815 million
to 11 countries in FY2010.54 The IMF has further agreed to
50 The figures cited in this subsection were extracted from various annual
reports of the respective organisations.
51 Critics have dubbed the IMF ‘the great winner of the global crisis’ as the
strong downward trend in its portfolio was suddenly reversed and the organi-
sation was put at the centre stage of crisis response (Van Waeyenberge et al.,
2010).
52 Special Drawing Rights or SDRs serve as the unit of account of the IMFD. Essers / Review of Devel
han perfectly matching its currency exposures, TCX retains
he currency risk on its balance sheet and attempts to achieve
isk diversification by holding a wide basket of local currencies
rom all over the world. TCX lost some of its shareholder value
hen most developing country currencies depreciated against
he US dollar following the collapse of Lehman, but recov-
red relatively quickly. As of October 2011, TCX had a total
xposure equivalent to US$835 million in 43 currencies, with
any of them pertaining to low-income countries. Participat-
ng as shareholders in TCX (or similar global funds), as the
frican Development Bank and Inter-American Development
ank already do, development banks can to some extent offload
he currency risk which they are not permitted to retain them-
elves. At present, it is not clear to what extent multilateral
evelopment banks make use of this possibility.
Third, there has been some reluctance from international
nancial institutions to provide contingent financing facilities
nder the form of credits (or grants) that would be automati-
ally disbursed in the event of a shock, without any additional
onditionality. The IMF, which qualifies as the natural candidate
or such liquidity provision because of its mandate and large cap-
tal base (Cordella and Levy Yeyati, 2006), attempted a first step
n this direction when it established the Contingent Credit Line
CCL) in the spring of 1999. Due to a lack of automaticity and
ther serious design problems, the CCL remained unused for
ears until it was abandoned in November 2003 (Abousleiman
t al., 2007). Only in March 2009, in response to the crisis,
he IMF set up a new Flexible Credit Line (FCL), again with
he intention of giving countries with strong economic funda-
entals and a proven track record access to credit on which
hey can draw unconditionally and at their own discretion. The
CL requires that countries do not yet experience balance-of-
ayment problems and have their public finances in order at
he moment of application. So far only Mexico, Poland and
olombia have entered into a FCL arrangement and none of them
ave drawn upon the available resources.48 In August 2010 the
MF introduced another, similar arrangement, the Precaution-
ry Credit Line, which was later broadened and rebaptised the
recautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL). This PLL applies less
tringent ex ante qualification criteria than the FCL, but requires
ommitment of the recipient country to certain policies aimed
t addressing problems identified during qualification (such ex
ost conditionality is absent in the FCL).49 Whether the FCL
nd PLL will avoid all of the problems that plagued the preced-
ng CCL, such as the stigma attached to it, and will attract many
ther countries remains however to be seen.
Within the World Bank, the Deferred Drawdown Option
DDO) on the IBRD’s Development Policy Loans is probably
losest to contingent financing. This DDO, instituted in 2001
nd revamped in 2008 (because of initial problems related to
ricing and slow disbursement) gives the borrowing country the
ossibility of deferring disbursements of the Development Pol-
cy Loan up to three years, using the credit when most needed.
48 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fcl.htm.
49 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pll.htm.
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olombia and Indonesia are two countries that benefitted from
he DDO in 2009. Some regional development banks have exper-
mented with or proposed comparable contingent credit lines.
onetheless, contingent finance is not at all mainstreamed into
he lending practices of international financial institutions and,
ore importantly, practically unavailable for low-income devel-
ping countries.
.2.3. Coping50
Just as in the case of countries themselves, ex post coping
as been the main route taken by the international community
n handling country vulnerability to external shocks. The IMF
n particular faced a sharp increase in demand for its resources
hen the crisis fully erupted late 2008.51 In the IMF’s FY2009
1 May 2008–30 April 2009) a record level of 65.8 billion in
pecial Drawing Rights52 (SDRs) was approved to 15 member
ountries through the IMF’s non-concessional lending facili-
ies. Access to SDR1.1 billion (approximately US$1.7 billion)
n new concessional loans and loan augmentations was granted
o 25 low-income and lower middle-income countries. FY2010
aw another SDR77.6 billion (US$116 billion) and SDR2.2 bil-
ion (US$3.3 billion) of support committed to non-concessional
nd concessional arrangements, respectively. In April 2009 the
-20 further agreed to enhance the IMF’s financial capacity,
ith commitments to triple the Fund’s non-concessional lending
esources, from a pre-crisis US$250 billion to US$750 billion,
nd double the size of its concessional support to low-income
ountries.53 In addition, about US$100 billion worth of SDR
llocations, part of a general US$250 billion liquidity injec-
ion, went to developing countries (of which US$18 billion to
ow-income countries) in August 2009.
At the same time, the IMF has been in a (ongoing) process of
evising the design of its lending facilities, aimed at enhancing
exibility and reducing conditionality. The Exogenous Shock
acility (ESF), for example, established in 2006 and expanded
ith a medium-term High Access Component (ESF-HAC) in
008, was set up with the purpose of giving timely support,
ithout too much burdensome pre-conditions, to low-income
ountries facing sudden and exogenous shocks. Under the ESF,ith its value determined by a basket of currencies. On April 30th, 2009, SDR1
as approximately equal to US$1.5.
53 The IMF seeks to boost its concessional resources available to low-income
ountries to US$17 billion by 2014.
54 As of January 2010, the ESF and ESF-HAC have been supplanted by
he Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and the Stand-by Credit Facility (SCF)
nder a reinvigorated Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) (see
ttp://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/poor.htm).
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argued that developing country vulnerability to these and future8 D. Essers / Review of Devel
harge zero interest on all concessional lending through 2012
nd increase concessionality thereafter.
Multilateral development banks were also quick in assist-
ng developing countries financially in coping with the global
risis, in line with their mandate of providing longer-term
evelopment finance. First, the World Bank Group commit-
ed an unprecedented total of US$58.8 billion in loans, grants,
quity investments and guarantees to the public and private sec-
or in member countries during its FY2009 (1 July 2008–30
une 2009), marking a 54% surge over FY2008 and all-time
igh for the Group. In FY2010 new commitments were further
ugmented to US$72.9 billion. The International Development
ssociation55 (IDA) alone accounted for about US$14 billion
f support to 63 low-income countries in FY2009, of which
S$11 billion in concessional credits, US$2.6 billion in grants
nd US$0.6 billion in guarantees. A further US$14.5 billion was
ommitted by IDA in FY2010. Part of these concessional funds,
bout US$2 billion in FY2009, were channelled through a spe-
ial Financial Crisis Response Fast-Track Facility in order to
peed up approval processes. In December 2009 an IDA Crisis
esponse Window (CRW) was approved, which was expected to
isburse US$1.6 billion of frontloaded committed IDA resources
nd voluntary donor contributions during its pilot phase from
anuary 2010 to June 2011. It is envisaged that this CRW will
volve from an ad hoc response in helping low-income countries
ith overcoming a crisis to a more systemic (and potentially con-
ingent) financing mechanism (see IDA, 2010). April 2009 also
aw the approval of a capital increase totalling US$86.2 billion
o enlarge IBRD’s future lending capacity.
Second, the Asian Development Bank approved financing
perations of US$16.1 billion in 2009 (US$14.3 billion in loans
nd grants), a 42% increase compared to 2008. This figure
ncludes the activities of the concessional Asian Development
und, which made up US$3.1 billion. One notable initiative
aken by the Asian Development Bank is the Countercyclical
upport Facility (CSF), a short-term, quick-disbursing lending
nstrument, geared to sustaining critical expenditures in Asian
iddle-income countries during the crisis, that was initiated in
une 2009 and had already disbursed US$2 billion by the end
f the year. A general capital increase (the first one since 1994)
urther promises to triple the Asian Development Bank’s capital
ase in the near future.
Third, the Inter-American Development Bank approved
S$15.5 billion in loans and guarantees over the course of 2009,
8% up from 2008. Lending through the Fund for Special Oper-
tions, the Bank’s concessional window, rose to over US$400
illion. A year earlier, loan approvals had already been boosted
o an all-time high by the creation of a new Liquidity Pro-
ram for Growth Sustainability. The Board of Governors of the
nter-American Development Bank have recently agreed upon general capital increase to over US$170 billion.
And finally, the African Development Bank’s loan, grant
nd other endorsements totalled about US$12.6 billion in 2009
55 The IDA is the branch of the World Bank Group that focuses on the world’s
oorest countries (most of which are unable to borrow from the IBRD).
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more than double the 2008 level), with its concessionary
frican Development Fund division accounting for approxi-
ately US$3.7 billion. Again, efforts were made to provide
ore flexibility to borrowers through a high-speed US$1.5 bil-
ion Emergency Liquidity Facility (ELF) and a US$1 billion
rade Finance Initiative, both launched in March 2009. Also
he African Development Bank ensured a capital increase that
ripled its capital base.
The remarkable surge in funds and new, exceptional initia-
ives suggests that international financial institutions have been
erious about their response to the global financial and eco-
omic crisis.56 Of course, not only the amounts of resources
ommitted or disbursed count. The way in which resources
re being allocated and invested as well as the accompany-
ng adjustment programmes which are implemented matter a
reat deal too for recovery. Here, the IMF has come under siege
or allegedly applying double standards, allowing huge fiscal
timulus packages for most advanced economies while advising
usterity measures in the programmes of developing countries
o which they lend. In a recent report the IMF itself argues that
the design of [its] recent [low-income country] programs has
hown considerable flexibility, providing expanded policy space
n the face of the [food, fuel and financial] crises’, accommodat-
ng (among other policies) a looser monetary stance and larger
scal deficits (IMF, 2009b: 4). These assertions have been con-
ested by Weisbrot et al. (2009) who find that 31 out of 41 IMF
greements with borrowing countries, many of which low- and
ower middle-income, that were active in October 2009 advo-
ated procyclical fiscal or monetary policies (and 15 programme
greements advocated both). Van Waeyenberge et al. (2010) are
qually critical. They claim that the policy space granted to bor-
owing countries, if any, was at best moderate and biased towards
he short term, with again tighter fiscal and monetary targets pre-
cribed for 2010. The debate on flexibility and conditionality of
upport to developing countries’ own coping efforts is thus likely
o continue.
.  Conclusions  and  moving  forward
In looking at the global financial and economic crisis from
 vulnerability perspective, this paper has attempted to shine a
ight on a number of important themes in the discussion on future
evelopment paths of emerging and non-emerging (low-income)
eveloping countries.
A crisis originating in the US and Western Europe spilled over
rom its epicentre and was transmitted to developing countries
nder the form of multiple exogenous shocks: most importantly
 reversal of private capital flows and slump in trade, but prob-
bly also a slowdown in remittances and bilateral aid. We havehocks depends on the probability  of  such shocks  occurring in the
rst place, on the exposure  to such shocks, and on the resilience
56 Even if all this falls short of the US$1 trillion in official finance developing
ountries would need to cope with the crisis, a figure put forward by Nancy
irdsall of the Center for Global Development (see Birsall, 2009).
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or capacity to react appropriately) of developing countries, and
ave used this decomposition to assess previous and ongoing
fforts to measure country vulnerability empirically. We find
hat recent work by the IMF does take into account all three
ulnerability components, but that there is some room left to
onsider exposure and resilience variables in a more joint fash-
on and make the shock component more explicit. Additional
esearch efforts will be necessary if we are to make the vulnera-
ility concept proposed in this paper ready for practical (policy)
se, not the least because of problems with data availability.
Further, the paper has shown that vulnerability to external
hocks matters a great deal for developing countries, as the
utput volatility that shocks bring about reduces growth and
ampers poverty reduction. If one is genuine about develop-
ent, the probability of shocks will have to be brought down,
ountry exposure to external shocks needs to be diminished,
nd/or country resilience must be built.
In focussing on the latter two approaches we have identi-
ed four categories of interventions to deal with vulnerability,
hereby borrowing Perry’s (2009) taxonomy; all were found to
ave specific advantages as well as important drawbacks. First,
oping, i.e. leaving vulnerability unchanged, can be painful and
s inherently backward-looking. Second, prevention  by reduc-
ng exposure to shocks typically takes a long time (which not
ll countries have). Third, increasing resilience to shocks by
eans of self-insurance  often carries high opportunity costs.
nd fourth, market  insurance  and  hedging, an alternative strat-
gy of building resilience, may be politically sensitive and is
argely unavailable to those countries that need it most. This
aper has therefore advocated a multi-layered ‘therapy’, com-
ining the aforementioned strategies with attention to the short
nd long term, mindful of country specifics, and with roles to
lay for both countries themselves and the international com-
unity.
A first (non-exhaustive) review of developing country expe-
iences and interventions by development banks and the IMF
eveals that considerable progress has been made in dealing
ith vulnerability before and during the crisis. However, coping
ith the aftermath of shocks still seems the main route taken by
ow-income developing countries themselves and international
nancial institutions alike. Besides, most emerging economies
ave opted to self-insure through reserves accumulation. We
aintain that much more is to be done to overcome vulnerabil-
ty, and our review enables us to suggest some ways forward,
lbeit tentatively; more extensive research in each of the areas
entioned is strongly needed.
On a short- to medium-term basis, developing countries
hould try to use any fiscal space they have in a targeted and
ountercyclical way and save up part of windfall export earnings
or dire times, even if this will be difficult from a political econ-
my perspective. An open discussion with possible investors on
he use of market-based derivative products, such as commod-
ty futures or GDP-indexed debt, would also be useful. In the
onger run, countries should increase efforts aimed at export sec-
or and export partner diversification. Attempting to attract more
quity-type external finance from a broader range of partners,
n the other hand, would constitute a promising capital portfolio
Bnt Finance 3 (2013) 61–83 79
iversification strategy. Moreover, local currency bond markets
ill need to be further deepened or developed where non-
xistent, in particular in low-income countries.
The agenda for international financial institutions such as
he World Bank, regional development banks and the IMF, is
qually large. First, they should sustain their latest endeavours
f making credit disbursements quicker and more flexible, and
f lowering the attached conditionality (so as to widen pol-
cy space for recipient countries). Further experimentation with
ocal currency finance provision, appropriately designed deriva-
ive products and contingent credit lines is also warranted. This
ould benefit international financial institutions themselves as
hey have a financial and reputational stake in better risk man-
gement by their vulnerable clients (see Claessens, 2005). These
nstitutions would moreover do good to revise (and adapt to new
ealities) their own risk management policies; they are in a much
etter position than developing countries to take on additional
isks (without impairing their credit rating), especially in view
f recent capital injections. Meanwhile, initiatives such as TCX,
hat allow multilaterals to offload certain risks (which they can-
ot or do not want to retain on their balance sheets for now),
hould be given a fair chance. Over a longer period, interna-
ional financial institutions themselves need to improve on the
ountercyclicality of the loans and grants they disburse. Finally,
hey should take on the intermediary role of market develo-
ers, assisting developing countries in eliminating barriers to
nd kick-starting long-term local currency bond markets.
A long and arduous road lies ahead, both for developing
ountries and those that intend to help them.
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